University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Business - Accounting & Finance
Working Papers

Faculty of Business and Law

1996

An Analysis Of International Inter-Bank Settlement Problems And
Responses
G. Hartono
University of Wollongong

G. Gniewosz
University of Wollongong

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/accfinwp
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons

Recommended Citation
Hartono, G. and Gniewosz, G., An Analysis Of International Inter-Bank Settlement Problems And
Responses, School of Accounting & Finance, University of Wollongong, Working Paper 2, 1996.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/accfinwp/63

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG

DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE

WORKING PAPERS SERIES

AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL INTER-BANK
SETTLEMENT PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES

by

Gani Hartono and Gerhard Gniewosz
The University of Wollongong
1996

96/2

Abstract
Timely and adequate settlement of international inter-bank payments has always been a
major concern for the banking industry. However the 1974 failure of Herstatt Bank,
and the disruption which hit the financial markets, ushered in an era of heightened
concern about the potential vulnerability of the international settlement systems.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the encountered settlement problems and
attempted solutions. Nowhere are these efforts more apparent then in the European
attempt to create a single financial market.
One of the more interesting developments in this evolution towards regional and global
payment markets has been the push towards real-time settlement systems with
collateralisation.
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Introduction

The 1974 failure of Herstatt Bank: and the disruption which hit financial markets ushered
in an era of heightened concern about the potential vulnerability of payments systems,
especially the wholesale large-value systems, to systemic risk and other problems.
Systemic risk - the likelihood that a problem in one institution will cause the insolvency
of healthy institutions - through runs, the creation of liquidity problems, or other forces,
has been a major policy focus {Kaufman (1994)}.

This concern has grown with the stock market crashes during 1987 and 1989, the
problems in unwinding some of the contracts in the failure of bank: of New England and
for several other important reasons. First, the sheer growth in large volume payments has
heightened the potential financial stakes, should a financial meltdown occur. Second,
technology and technological change have had a major impacts on the kinds of
transactions taking place, both increasing the speed and lowering the costs with which
they may be completed.

Third, technology has also permitted the unbinding and

restructuring of transactions whose risk characteristics and cross institutional linkages are
just now being understood. Complicated derivative transactions with notional values in
the trillions did not exist as recently as five or six years ago. A recent Wall Street
Journal article placed the amounts at more than $35 trillion. {Smith and Lipin (l994)}.

These new instruments and markets have introduced new and complex linkages across
securities markets and domestic and world payments systems. Fourth, the globalization
of financial markets has tied economies and markets together in ways that introduce new
risks and concerns into the mechanisms by which traditional clearing and settlement take
place.

Fifth, recent private sector and public sector developments in the way largevolume payments are cleared and settled, and more specifically, the introduction of
bilateral and multilateral settlements procedures may affect systemic risks in important
ways. Finally, the above developments have served simply to heighten both private and
public sector concerns about the need to understand and control system vulnerability to
systemic risks. Fortunately, private sector and public sector entities have paid a great
deal of attention to these issues at both the domestic and international levels. The
payment system risks and uncertainties are affected by the nature of the market
infrastructure (e.g., the type of computer systems, software, backups, audit and control
procedures that are in place), the legal structure governing asset ownership and
settlement of claims in default, and market conventions (such as netting arrangements,
the timing of the provision of good funds, by collateral and reserve provisions, by
delivery conventions, and by time and distance). Both governments and private markets
have sought to curtail payments system risks, and these risks are the focus of the
remainder of this article. All have received intensive consideration and review by both
regulators and market participants. The key types of risks are listed in table 1 (fraud risk
and technology, e.g., hardware and software risk, seem to be self-evident and will not be
examined further).

Great strides have been made in understanding the risks created by the rapid
evolution of financial markets.

Well-structured analyses of the risks and related

problems have been underway for some time, and the outline, if not the details, of the
public policy issues have been well delineated. In this context, it is difficult to carve out
a contribution that might make a difference in this debate. What this article seeks to do
is a bit more modest. It reviews recent concerns about risks in financial markets and
attempts to synthesize what is known about the policy issues.
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Finally, it seeks to explain why the recent evolution of more and more payments,
clearing, and settlement systems, toward real-time gross settlement systems (RTGS) is
taking place in the face of evidence and analysis that alternative systems employing
bilateral netting and multilateral netting can, in the absence of uncertainty about the
status of claims in bankruptcy, both reduce risk and be more efficient.

The central argument of this article is that despite the theoretical advantages of
payments systems which incorporate various netting schemes and credit provisions, the
movement towards real-time gross settlement systems is being driven by three main
considerations which increasingly are reducing the advantages of netting-type clearing
and settlement systems. {Kane (1991, 1988)}. The first is the problem of resolving
uncertainties in the way defaults will be handled in payments systems at a fast enough
rate to keep pace with the evolution of new instruments and markets. The second is the
rapid decline in computing costs and increases in processing speed which are reducing
the efficiency gains from netting arrangements. The third is the movement towards 24hour trading which will make netting arrangements difficult to implement.

The rest of this article first lays out the nature of the systems that have evolved to
clear and settle payments and asset transfers in very generic terms. It then discusses the
risks associated with these systems. Finally, the evolutionary path that systems have
taken are described and perhaps explained, with emphasis on the private-sector responses
that have emerged to deal with risk control and financial system fragility.

Table 1. Risks in payments systemrelationships

A
B.
C.
D.
E.

Legal risks
Supervisoryrisks
Settlement / credit risks
Settlement / Liquidity risk
Herstatt risk
F. Fraud risk
G. Technology risk
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Asset and Payment Transfer System
The potential for fragility in the payments system has long been the source of public
policy concern. In the U.S., an early source of instability was due to the fact that bank
notes were issued with the promise to redeem their face amount in specie (gold and/or
silver). Runs occurred when demands for note conversion exceeded the available supply
of specie, creating both liquidity and solvency problems if, given sufficient time, enough
good assets were not available to convert to specie to meet the demand.

Early private sector responses resulted in extensions of credit and liquidity to the
affected banks by other banks or through local clearing houses which had been organized
to clear and return notes to the issuing banks within a region. Alternatively, banks
experiencing runs either suspended convertibility or went out of business. Suspension of
convertibility prevented the spread of the demand for money to other institutions whose
reserves would not be depleted to meet the demand for converting assets into specie by
the institutions experiencing the run {Kaufman (1986) & Bryant (1980)}. Suspension did
however result in loss of purchasing power by the holders of the non-convertible notes,
which were often only accepted at deep discounts in exchange for goods or services at
redeeming banks {Einsenbeis (l987)}. Since note holders ultimately bore much of the
costs of non-convertibility, they had incentives to worry about banks solvency. Indeed,
the evidence is that they did; the result was that banks during this period typically has
significantly higher capital ratios than in the post deposit insurance era {Kaufman
(1986)}. The first public sector regulatory actions to ensure convertibility were to
establish maximum ratios of notes to specie.
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With the growth of deposits and importance of cheques as a medium of exchange,
liquidity concerns changed from focusing on specie convertibility to the ability to meet
demands for withdrawal of currency or payments of cheques to other banks. This was
accomplished by maintaining sufficient volumes of reserves balances, demand notes,
(which could be recalled at any time), government securities, or other marketable assets.
Again, clearing house often required maintenance of reserve assets as collateral to meet
cheques-clearing houses demands, and the clearing houses also were sources of
emergency funds from time to time. Many states also imposed minimum reserve
requirements as a condition for being granted a charter.

Not all regulatory responses, however, were stabilizing; in fact, some even proved
to be an important source of systematic risk. An example of this in the U.S. was the
reserve requirement feature of the National Banking Act 1864. Under this act, legal
reserves to meet liquidity needs included not only cash vault but also deposits held at
Reserve City and Central Reserve City Banks. During this period, most payments were
made by cheques drawn on demand deposits with the remainder being made in currency.
Demand deposit were the dominant from the banks liability to fund loans. There were not
close substitutes for bank liabilities or transactions functions they performed, nor were
financial markets sufficiently deep that there were ready markets for the assets on bank
balance sheets. Within that structure, protecting the payments mechanism meant
preventing the cumulative collapse of the money supply when runs to currency occurred
and the supply of demand deposits contracted cumulatively {Gorton (1991) & Wilson
(l993)}. Since the money supply consisted chiefly of currency and demand deposits,
protecting the payment system meant that eliminating bank failures and ensuring banks
soundness would prevent the destruction of demand deposits. This is key feature of the
U.S. banking system was largely true of systems in other countries as well (e.g. Canada,
Australia). Currency and demand deposits were the prime medium of exchange.

5

Today, payment systems are larger, inherently more complex, have many more
components-both private and public-and are subject to different risks than in the past.
The cheques/demand deposit system, which most currently regulatory systems and
central banks sought to protect, is relatively small in terms of the value of payments and
financial transactions made {BIS (1993c)}. In the U.S., for example cash payments
account for less than .5% of the transactions made {Furash and Company (1994)}.

Corrigan (1990), Junker, Summers and Young (1991), and Mengle (1992) have
detailed the complexity of modem-day payment systems. They layout the relationships
among the various types of financial-asset transfer, clearing, and settlement systems
within the U.S., concentrating on large dollar or wholesale payments. In characterizing
the U.S. system, Coriggan (1990) describes an inverted pyramid set of relationships with
over-the-counter and pit-trading dealer and parties at the top. In these markets, trades are
negotiated, and then delivery takes place at agreed upon times. Payment and settlement
take place in different markets altogether. The next layer are those markets with netting
relationships as part of their trading, such as securities, futures, and options clearing
operations. Here, buy-and-sell transactions are cumulated through the course of the day
and are netted to determine the amount to be settled, usually at the end of the business
day. These systems settle through other financial institutions, which in turn clear and
settle through clearing houses, private settlement systems such as U.S. CHIPS or U.K
CHAPS, which in turn ultimate settle through (in the case of the U.S.) Fedwire. At the
foundation or bottom, of Corrigan' 5 inverted pyramid is the central-bank clearing and
settlement system. In the U.S., this is Fedwire, where interbank clearings are settled, and
ownership of book entry securities are exchanged. With a little modification-self
imposed caps, their discussions apply to how the systems most countries operate today.
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With few exceptions throughout the world, private sector arrangements handle all
aspects of payments transactions, except perhaps for final settlement (or payment), which
usually requires exchange of ownership on an agent basis of central-bank money. Hence
the system for exchanging ownership of central bank deposits-the so-called wholesale
market-underpins the clearing and settlement activities in other markets. It is the
potential for disruptions in these other markets to suddenly impact each other and
ultimately and unwittingly transmit problems to the large-value payments markets that
has become a major source of concern.

In nearly every one of these markets, each part of the transaction process is often

broken into several parts, with different intermediaries often interjecting themselves in
the middle between the transacting parties. For example, in the case of the sale of bookentry Treasury securities, the buying agent instruct his bank or broker to purchase a
security. The receiving institution's bank takes possession of the security and transfers
that ownership to the buyer. Time delays and clearing arrangement may dictate exactly
when the selling institution's bank and the seller receive and given use of funds and when
the buyer and its agent bank ultimately settle. For example, the two intermediary banks
may have several securities transactions with each other during the course of the day,
with only the net difference owned actually being transferred at the end of the day.

There are several ways to categorize these payments systems in terms of the types
of customers they serve, the types of transactions involved, the size of typically
transactions that are exchanged, the frequency of the transactions, the types of
participants, etc. For example, retail checks and European gyro systems handle large
volume of relatively small paper and electronic transactions as individuals engage in dayto-day exchange.
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Paper cheques systems in the U.S. have traditionally been focus of regulatory and
supervisory concerns and provided the rational for much of the financial regulatory and
infrastructure in place today. Large-value payment systems are largely electronic interbank markets and account for the vast majority of the value of payments in developed
economies. Such systems tend to be the entry point for central bank implementation of
monetary policy. They also generally involve urgent intra-day transfers of claims which
may be reused several times during the course of the day before they are settled.
Participants in these markets may be direct, indirect, or customers. Table 2 {from BIS
(1993)}provides a categorization of participants in inter-bank fund transfer systems and
their responsibilities. Direct participants usually own the systems or are specifically
authorized members who settle accounts directly with the system or its other direct
participants. Indirect participants clear and settle through the accounts of the direct
participants who act as their agents. Finally, customers usually are the initiators and
ultimate recipients of value resulting from the purchase and sale of assets. They work
through agents who may be either direct participants in the payments systems-and who
are ultimately responsible for settlement-or through indirect participants who settle
with the direct participants.
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Table 2. Classification of participants in IFTS

Responsibility
Identified by IFTS
Identified with a
system or SWIFT

Responsibility

address and

Exchange of Responsibility

for fulfillment

Share

Power of

permitted to send

payment

of standards &

expenses

decision

Participants

payment orders

Direct

Yes

Yes

for intra-system

Yes

Yes for its own

Yes

Yes or No

operations.
Indirect

Yes or No

Yes or No

No

Yes or No

Yes or Yes or No

Customers

No

No

No

No

No

No

Source: BIS (1993), p.lO.

Literally hundreds of different markets exist to facilitate the exchange of financial
assets (not to mention real assets), such as government securities, mortgage-backed
securities, stocks and bonds, options and futures, short-term debt instruments such as
commercial paper, and foreign exchange contracts. Transactions in these assets often
take place on organized exchanges while others do not. Some of the exchanges are
privately owned (e.g. privately placed bonds) while others are publicly owned (e.g.
commercial-bank loans). Regardless, the transaction has several aspects which need to be
managed for it to be completed. These include notification of the intent for two parties to
enter a transaction and the terms of that transaction, the delivery of the asset to the
ultimate purchaser, and finally the payment and settlement of the transaction
acceptable medium.
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The simplest of these markets is the cash market, where currency (government
fiat money) is exchanged for goods and services. Notification, clearing, and settlement
takes place simultaneously. No major markets, however, use currency to accomplish
trades; transportation costs, security concerns, and the sheer volume of currency required
make settlement in currency impractical {Mengle (1992)}.

Once a transaction conclude to be a spot transaction, with instantaneous delivery
and settlement in cash government fiat money, it is either paid for using a paper check or
some other method of transferring value, such as electronic transfer of funds. Any such
transaction has two main components that must be discharged: clearing and settlement.
During clearing, which can be done by any number of different parties (both banks and
non-banks alike), information is transferred from the payer to payee concerning the
transaction which establishes the terms and parties to the transaction. The final transfer
of value, or settlement, however, is almost always done through banks. Thus. Banks and
inter-bank payments systems are at the heart of all these markets.

Value can be transferred in several ways. If the payer and payee both have
accounts at the same institution, then the payer's account can be debited and the payee's
account credited. Clearing and settlement take place through the exchange bank debt,
with no governmental involvement. If the contracting parties have accounts at different
institutions, then similar transfers can be made by debiting and crediting clearing house
accounts. Alternatively, value can be conveyed by settling through the central bank by
exchanging ownership of central bank deposits.
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The institutional arrangements for completing the clearing and settlement
functions have grown extremely complex. Most clearing is done in the private sector,
while settlement takes place in both the private sector and through central banks. The
specifics of the settlement arrangements differ widely across the various systems, both
within the United States and across and banking systems throughout the rest of the world
{BIS, (l993c)}.These range from gross settlement systems, such as Fedwire in the US,
through which each transaction results in a debt or credit to a settlement account, to
various types bilateral and multilateral netting arrangements. Table 3 details some of the
netting and related features of both retail and large value payments systems in G-IO
countries. They include both government and privately owned systems. Most are netting
systems, but several are real-time gross settlement systems. Some have open
membership; others are restricted.

Under bilateral netting arrangements, which occur in many derivative, foreign
exchange, securities, and equity markets, two institutions mutually agree to cumulate
transactions during a specified period of time, with only the net amount being settled for
value, usually through the banking system, at the end of the business day or several days
thereafter. Under multilateral netting, an institution agrees to cumulate transactions
involving several parties, and settle the amount either owned or to be received
collectively from the other parties to the arrangement through a single agent, usually a
clearing house. Examples of multilateral netting systems are CIDPS (Clearing House
Inter-bank Payments Systems) through which most of the world dollar payments are
settled or CHAPS (Clearing House Automated Payment System) in the U.K.
Interestingly, CHAPS has recently indicated its intention to move to 100 percent
collateralization and real-time gross settlement {Bank of England and APACS (1994)}.
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Table 3. Attributes of Gl O-retail and large value payments systems (1992)

Country
System
Belgium
Clearing House of Beigium (CH)

Centre for Exchange of Operations
to be Cleared (CEC)

Type

Settlement

Membership

Number of
transactions
(thousands)

24666

Large value
& retail

Multilateral
netting

Open

Retail

Multilateral
netting

Open

695200

Restricted

1560

Canada
Inter-bank International Payment
Systems (lIPS)

Large value

France
Paris Clearing House (CH Paris)
Clearing House of Provinces
Systeme Interbancarie de Telecompensation (SIT)
Transferts Banque d France (TBF)

Large value
& retail
Retail
Retail
Large value

Restricted

761969

Open

3121268

Restricted

301800

Open

11000

Real time gross
settlement
Multilateral
netting

Open

71865

Restricted

7774

Multilateral
netting
Multilateral
netting
Multilateral
netting

Open

292129

Open

1804

Open

2780

Restricted

6119

Restricted

3710

Multilateral
netting
Multilateral
netting
Bilateral
netting
Real time gross
settlement

Germany
Eiliger Zahlungsverkehr (EIL-ZV)

Large value

Elektronische Abrechnung
Filetransfer (EAF)

Large value

Italy
Local clearing
Electronic Memoranda (ME)

Large value
& retail
Large value

Interbank Society for Automation (SIPS) Large value

Japan
Foreign Exchange Yen Clearing

Large value

Bank ofJapan Financial Network
System (BOJ-NET)

Large value
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Multilateral
netting
Real time gross
settlement

Table 3. continued
Netherlands
(Bank-Giro Centre (BGC-CH)
8007-SWIIFT

Sweden
Clearing and Interbank System (RIX)
Data-Clearing

Switzerland
Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC)
DTAlLSV

United Kingdom
Clearing House Automated
Payment System (CHAPS)
Checks Clearing and Credit
Clearing (Cheque/credit)
United States
Fedwire
Clearing House Interbank
Payment System (CHIPS)

Retail

Multilateral
netting
Multilateral
netting

Open

1043.7

Open

1.8

Large value
& retail
Retail

Real time gross
settlement

Restricted

79

Open

141436

Large value
& retail
Retail

Real time gross
settlement
Multilateral
netting

Restricted

64279

Restricted

56704

Large value

Multilateral
netting
Multilateral
netting

Restricted

9000

Restricted

2577000

Real time gross
settlement
Multilateral
netting

Open

67600

Restricted

39073

Large value

Retail

Large value
Large value

Source: BIS (l993c), Table lOa.
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Netting arrangements can drastically reduce the number of payments that have to
be settled, can reduce the need for liquidity, and also have significant implications for
risk exposure of the parties involved {Gilbert (1992), BIS (1990, 1993a), and Mengle
(1990, 1992)}.The orders of magnitude of the payments reductions can be dramatic. For
example, if an institution has 100 transactions with each of 10 institutions, then 1000
individual transactions have to be settled under a real-time gross settlement system. The
institution must maintain sufficient liquidity to be able to settle each transaction as it
flows through the payment system. In contrast, under bilateral netting ~Ei~-- or only 45
transactions need to be settled. Under multilateral netting, a maximum of only 1
transaction per institution in the netting arrangement has to be settled. In general, if m is
the number of transactions and n is the number of institutions, then the limits on the
number of transactions to be processed are:

m for gross settlement systems,
n(n-l)/2 for bilateral systems, and

Max(n) for multilateral netting system with n participants.

The benefits of netting to liquidity management are also clear. Netting
arrangements obviate the need to assure that funds are available to settle each
transaction. The risk implications of the various systems are discussed in the next
section.
The breaking up of clearing/settlement process into component parts results in a
tiring of markets. Securities, futures and options, derivatives and other markets clear
under one arrangement, but largely settle in the interbank markets. Moreover, as a result
of this separation, seemingly unrelated markets and institutions are linked together in
ways that both create and may transfer risks in one market to participants in other
markets. There are four generally accepted generic types of risks that have been
identified and have been the focus of much attention. These are discussed in the next
section
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Payment system risk
Payments system risks have been well explored in the literature. They include
operational, legal, credit, and liquidity risks {Gilbert (1992), Mengle (1992), Saunders
(1996)}. Conceptually, it is easy to identify these risks separately, but in reality they tend
to be interrelated, and the realization of one can lead to occurrences ofthe others.

Operation risks arise from possible breakdowns in the computer systems or
problems with accounting, physical delivery, internal controls, or other process elements
associated with clearing and settling transactions. Numerous examples of such process
risks have occurred and have been the source of both considerable embarrassment and
consternation. One of the most glaring was the overloading of the government securities
clearing system of the Bank of New York in 1985. When the processing capacity of the
computer program was exceeded, instead of stopping the system or sending an error
message, the system simply continued to accept delivery of securities with the
corresponding debiting of the bank's reserve account through Fedwire at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. But the system did not then complete the rest of the
transaction by forwarding the securities to the ultimate purchaser and receiving payment.
The deficit in the bank's reserve account exceeded $22 billion by the close of the
business day {BIS (1989), (1990), (l993)}. This created a liquidity risk-that is, a
temporary inability to settle transactions at the agreed upon date. Bank of New York
clearly was not insolvent, but was neither able to liquidate assets to meet the demand for
funds nor to obtain needed funds by completing the delivery of the securities, thus
replenishing its funds from the delivery proceeds. In this case, the problem was solved
when the central bank provided an ovemightJoan from the discount window. Given the
amount of funds needed, it is doubtful that the other historic way that solvent but illiquid
institutions met the demand for funds, that is, by borrowing from a clearing house or
other banks, could have been accomplished.

IS

This example illustrates that the four categories of risk are nor independent, and that a
settlement or operational risk can create credit risk, or, in this case, lead to a liquidity
crisis which could expose system participants to large, unanticipated losses. Whether the
system exposure to Bank of New York would have caused liquidity or solvency problems
at other institutions in unclear, and no scenarios have been put forth to indicate how
problems might have spread. Nevertheless, it is this uncertainty which creates the specter
of financial fragility (the realization of large risks in certain states of the world)

Similarly, during the 1987 crash of the stock market, transactions ran far ahead of
the ability of the electronic clearing system to process transactions. The breakdown
disrupted the orderly flow of prices to the market place. Limit, stop, and other orders
flows were disrupted by the sheer volume of transactions and the inability of existing
computer system to handle them. As a result, many traders were either not made or were
made at prices that participants would not have accepted had they had full information.
The market responses to such problems have been (1) to expand capacity, which
generates an interesting side issue of how much idle capacity a market should maintain to
deal with an infrequent peak load problem, (2) to build n redundancy by providing
backup computer and other systems, not unlike the arrangements made by public utilities
to reroute electricity or telephone calls, (3) to perform process audits, and finally (4) to
engage in disaster scenario planning and simulations in order to identify risks and build
in appropriate protections. But unanticipated circumstances, such as the disruptions
caused by the World Trade Center bombing, show that even unlikely events can both
occur and have significant ripple effects through markets {Newland (l994)}.

The difference between a liquidity problem and credit risk, as it relates to
settlement, is largely one of degree rather than kind. Credit risk arises when an institution
defaults by failing to settle on any or all of its obligations.
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Credit risk can occur at any step of the payments process, affecting customers, direct and
indirect market participants. For example, if a customer initiates a transaction ordering a
bank to purchase an assets, but then cannot accept delivery, the institution is faced with
several alternatives. Credit can be provided to the customer until funds are received.
Alternatively, the transaction can either be canceled, or it can be completed by the bank,
which then takes possession of the assets (or the customer's available collateral) . Finally,
in the extreme, the bank can default on its own obligation to settle if settlement time has
not yet occurred. If the buyer has good collateral and a sound credit rating, then extension
of credit may be the best alternative. Canceling the transaction may not be an option,
especially if delivery has already taken place.

Settlement failure in the above example can be controlled if the bank puts a hold
on the buyer's funds at the time the transaction was ordered, effectively collateralizing
the transaction. For good customers, however, this may not be necessary, practical or
efficient, especially if both the probability of default and the expected loss are small
relative to the bank's resources. This suggests that diversification, control of credit
concentrations, and maintenance of adequate capital are key management tools in
limiting settlement/credit risk exposure.

The lack of a hold -policy illustrates that an institution's vulnerability to credit
risk often results from the underlying conventions and structure of the markets involved,
rather than from the realization of performance risks associated with the underlying
projects and investments. For example, under Fedwire, which is a gross settlement
system in which an institution's reserve account is debited or credited on a transactionsby-transactions basis, the Fed has chosen not to prohibit transactions when an institution
does not have good funds in its reserve account. Subject to limits, the Fed permits an
institution to make and accept transfers continuously throughout the day, but only
requires that the institution close out its account at the end of the day, either by
transferring in good funds or by borrowing from the discount window.

17
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Since delivery conventions on vanous securities transactions, federal funds, and
commercial paper vary considerably across markets, it is not uncommon for major dealer
and correspondent banks to be in net deficit reserve positions for a large portion of the
business day. When this happens, the Federal Reserve become a lender, providing credit
to the institution with daylight overdraft. Not only is the Federal Reserve, and hence the
US taxpayer, a creditor, but also, until April 1994, this credit was provided free of
charge, which had implication for risk-management incentives within the payments
system and individual institutions {Gilbert (1992)}.

The historical roots of this convention lie partly in the Federal Reserves' technical
inability to monitor continuously the flows of funds into and out of all banks' reserve
accounts, and hence to prevent overdrafts form arising {Summer and Young (l991)}.
Also, this free credit helped offset the other burdens of Federal Reserve membership,
which was, up until the Monetary Control Act of 1980 mandated holding of reserves
against transactions accounts, eroding at a rate sufficient to cause the Federal Reserve to
believe that it might be losing its ability to implement monetary policy.

Another structural feature of the Fedwire system-the fact that the system
provides finality-increases the likelihood that credit will be extended. This is, once a
Fedwire transaction is initiated and accepted by the Federal Reserve into the system for
electronic processing, the receiving bank is granted immediate use, and an irrevocable
claim, on the funds (regardless of whether the sender ultimately defaults). In this respect
the Fed interposes itself between the two parties to the transaction, as do many other
clearing and settlement institutions such as futures and options exchanges, increasing its
exposure to credit risk.
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Not all payments systems have finality; some of those that do, do not necessarily
have absolute credible finality ( only central banks can create riskless money assets in
unlimited amounts). Again, a useful example can be taken from the United States. The
other major wholesale dollar clearing system in the U.S. is CHlPS, the large-dollar
clearing and settlement system owned by major New York money center banks and
operated by the New York Clearing House Association. Until recently, CIDPS did not
provide finality. Failure to settle on the part of a system member meant that transactions
involving the defaulting party would have to be unwound, and in the extreme, potentially
all transactions would have to be unwound. Because of the extreme number and volume
of transactions which flow through CHIPS every day, unwinding the failure of a
participant to settle could put other institutions in extreme deficit positions which might
not easily or quickly be settled. The result could unwittingly transmit a problem in one
institution to others in the system, resulting in a systematic risk problem. The only
recourse to affected institutions would be to seek emergency loans or to discount assets
with the Federal Reserve. This makes the Federal Reserve the backup source of liquidity
and lender of last resort to CHIPS, even though it does not run or is not directly involved
with CHIPS, except to allow settlement through a reserve account at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York {Clair (1991)}.
Concern for the systematic risks inherent in the structure of CHIPS lead
participants to institute payments finality. To provide the necessary resources to make the
promise of finality credible, loss-sharing arrangements among members were instituted
in the form of posting of collateral sufficient to cover an institution's maximum net debt
exposure. On the one hand, the result is to use finality to avoid the need to unwind
transactions in the event of a settlement failure, but it also ties the fate of all member
institutions to the overall health of the system, and potentially increases the member
institutions' exposure to catastrophic systematic risk, to the extent that posted collateral
may not be sufficient to cover actual losses. The effects of this change on member
incentives to limit risk or to engage in moral hazard behavior to shift even greater
burdens to the Federal Reserve remains to be seen.
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Whether CHIPS finality is credible, is open to question; it is inconceivable that
the member institutions would, in the extreme, all go out of business to meet their
commitments. Rather, the more likely scenario is that institutions facing default would
turn to the Federal Reserve as lender of last resort. It is this problem that makes central
banks the lenders of last resort to all payments systems, and raises the issue of whether
and to what degree they are subject to moral hazard and adverse selection behavior
during times of crisis and fragility.
As markets have become increasingly global, timing differences and differences
in clearing and settlement conventions can add temporal and other dimensions to credit
risks not always found in domestic markets. This was clearly demonstrated in 1974,
when Herstatt bank failed and was closed by German authorities. The bank had entered
into agreements to exchange marks for dollars. The mark leg of the transactions were
settled, but the dollar portions were not settled in New York at the time Herstatt was
closed, since the deadline on CHIPS for final settlement was about 4:30 PM Eastern
Standard time.{Walmsley (l985)}. This left the counter-parties to the foreign exchange
transactions thinking that they had more funds than they did. When the dollar
transactions failed to settle, large losses to counter-parties resulted. This temporal
dimension to credit/systemic risk has come to be known as "Herstatt Risk" and can be
vary large. A more recent example is provided when BCCI (Bank of Credit and
Commerce International) was closed in 1991. The industrial Bank of Japan had paid 44
billion yen into BeCl's branch in Tokyo, for which payment was to be received in New
York from BCCrs New York Branch. When BCCI was closed, the dollar portion of the
transaction was never completed, Industrial Bank of Japan became creditor for $30
million {BIS (1993a,b,c)}. To some, this may look like ordinary credit risk, which indeed
it is. But its incidence is determined by the intervention policies pursued by the
regulatory authorities, whose actions cannot be easily predicted or priced. Simmers
(1991) indicates that settlement of foreign exchange transactions originating in the Far
East may be delayed in settlement through CHIPS by as much as 14 hours and amount to
as much as $425 billion dollars.
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The losses to dollar counterparties in the Herstatt case were the consequence of
the German authorities' timing of the closure of the institution rather than to the
realization of estimable default risk. Had the authorities waited until the U.S. dollar
markets had settled, then the losses to those expecting dollar transfers would not have
occurred. Such exposure is better characterized as settlement uncertainty rather than
settlement risk, since it is not possible to reliably estimate and cost out the implications
of regulatory actions and policies.

Herstatt-type risk can also be involved in solely dollar clearing system. In Asia,
through its Tokyo branch, the Chase Manhattan Bank operates a dollar clearing and
settlement service which offers finality and limited overdrafts and is guaranteed by
Chase. Participants are permitted to settle these overdrafts in New York across the
TokyolNew York business day. Furthermore, Tokyo balances at the end of the day may
be transferred to New York, either through the New York offices of Chase or Tokyo
banks or through CHIPS. In this case, problems in this satellite settlement and clearing
system, quickly have the potential to transmit liquidity and credit risk from Asia to New
York, and ultimately to the Federal Reserve, if it affects either CHIPS, Chase, or
significant New York correspondents. A failure to settle in New York on payments
guaranteed in Japan by Chase would create a form of Herstatt risk that would end up
having to resolved in New York. How problems in this system might be handled is
uncertain. Moreover, there has been little discussion of how the problem of the failure of
one institution to settle would cause a ripple effect across many institutions. At present,
concern flows from the sheer size of the potential losses rather than from an
understanding of well-articulated scenarios. Furthermore, regulatory agencies have
sometimes played on the fears that these potential losses represent in seeking to increase
their regulatory scope.
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Many other significant sources of uncertainty can also be identified in the
clearing and settlement processes in modem financial market. For example, when
clearing and settlement of financial settlement of financial assets are separated, a given
country's rules usually establish the exact point in time that a transaction has been
completed. The issue centers around transaction finality and the legal criteria for when
debts are discharged and who bears the losses in the event of default. Finality usually
occurs when the party selling the assets actually has "good funds," and mayor may not
correspond to the time that the sender has actually settled. For example, because Fedwire
provides finality, acceptance of payment order "guarantees" the receiver "good funds"
and discharges the debt, since the sender's reserve account is debited and the receiver's
bank's account is credited, even though the sender's bank may default on the settlement
of its reserve account with the Fed at the end of the day. When the institutions are located
in two separate countries, then transactions can sometimes be governed by the laws of
two separate countries, and, if transactions involve clearing houses, the laws where they
are located

The issue can quickly become murky, however, when one starts to examine the
problems involved in settlement failures

in bilateral and multilateral netting

arrangements-especially those involving forward dated contracts, such as foreign
exchange, derivatives, other cross-border markets. Final disposition of the liability
depends critically on the legal rules governing the disposition of debts and transaction in
the event of a default or bankruptcy {Mengle (1990)}. For example, if two institutions
have entered into a bilateral netting arrangement, then completion of all the transactions
subject to the arrangement depends upon settlement of the net position. If one of the
parties fails to settle because of a bankruptcy, then all the gross transactions subject to
netting may have to be undone, depending upon the legal rules affecting the markets in
which the transaction was settled. Since the legal rules may differ depending upon where
settlement takes place, and this may be beyond the receiver's control, significant
settlement uncertainty may exist.
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The exact status of these transactions, therefore, depends upon several sets of
laws: those governing bilateral netting arrangement, those governing the particular
settlement market involved, and the bankruptcy provisions and other related laws of the
country of the failed institution (and/or the laws of the resident country if the transaction
is recorded on the books of a branch of the failed bank). For example, netted transactions
may, or may not be regarded as discharged. Thus, the bankruptcy court may decide to
unbundle netted transactions, demanding payment for debts owned and disavowing
liabilities to creditors. In addition, country bankruptcy law may give creditors the right to
offset their liabilities to a failed entity against their claims on that entity. Thus, debts
owned on foreign exchange may be discharged with debts on securities, loans, or any
other assets. Not only do these bankruptcy laws affect the losses, but also how the losses
may be apportioned across various creditors. The legal situation in multilateral netting
arrangements introduce complexities several orders of magnitude greater then those
affecting bilateral arrangements { Juncker, Summer, and Young (1991)}.

There is considerable variation across countries in the treatment of transactions;
and thus uncertainty exists about how particular bankruptcies will be treated. This
uncertainty undermines the risk-reducing potential of bilateral and multilateral netting
arrangements, and creates the very real possibility that systemic risks could be heightened
rather than reduced when the laws governing netting are uniform across countries {BIS
(1990), Cohen and Roberds (l993)}. The uncertainties associated with their resolution
make it virtually impossible in today's environment to reliably assess the likely outcome
of a default scenario for many transactions {Knight (1971)}.
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Private sector responses to risk and uncertainty
Private sector entities have responded to the increased uncertainties, market risks
and evolving market technologies in many interesting ways. The responses involve (1)
contract design, (2) the micro market structure of exchanges and their rules governing
transactions, (3) private proposals to change laws governing transactions, and (4)
suggestions to increase governmental cross-border cooperation in financial rules,
regulation and supervision {Smith and Lippin (1994), Kane (1991)}.

Given the complexity of financial transactions and their inter-relationships, there
are significant problems in measuring, monitoring, and pricing what institutions' true risk
exposures are to each other and how risks flow directly and indirectly through
relationships with related customer groups. For example, customer X

may have several

relationships with its primary bank (bank A). This might include a loan, a swap, a deposit
account, and several foreign exchange transactions, etc. Customer X

may also have

similar relationships and transactions outstanding with bank B. In addition, bank A may
also have made loans in the form of advancing fed Funds to bank B. If customer X fails,
the entirety of its net position with bank A across all the relationships and transactions
represent its net direct risk exposure. Bank A may also be indirectly exposed through
bank B, if the customer's default causes bank B to default on its Federal Funds
obligations to A's primary bank. Measuring and monitoring these interrelated exposures
across the world and across different markets is truly a daunting modeling and
monitoring problem, made even more so by the dynamic and continual evolution of new
instrument and markets.
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The private sector responses to these risk measurements and monitoring of
payments risk-exposure have attempted to substitute rules and other mechanisms to
control customer risk-taking incentives. Actions have involved cooperatively owned
clearing and settlement systems and responses by individual participants as well. Control
mechanisms include maintenance of adequate capitalization, reliance upon contract
design to allocate risk and losses, collateralization of transactions, use of outside
guarantees and bonding, pricing, imposition of system membership requirements, and
other limits on risk exposure to individual and related parties. These responses may be
viewed as attempts to limit uncertainty and to provide incentives for member institutions
to control their own risks exposures.

For example, a great deal of attention has been paid to the process concerning the
structure of payment orders and to contract design as methods of reducing payment
system uncertainty regarding the legal status of various transactions in the event of
default. In netting arrangements, especially when dealing with customers with large
numbers of transactions and different types of credit and other relationships with a bank
or other payment system participant, institutions have employed rules to define rights of
setoff, defining collateral in the case of collateralized transactions. Netting by notation,
for example, is one contract feature that explicitly specifies that parties discharge all their
obligations to each other by transferring only the net amount due. Netting by notation
replaces two existing contracts for delivery of an asset on the same day with a single net
contract for that date. Similarly, another contract provision that has evolved is a closeout provision. A closeout provision becomes effective in bankruptcy and defines a
formula which will convert outstanding transactions into an immediately payable
amount. This would include all future date futures, options, forwards, and other future
liabilities. So important are these contract provisions and their design for netting
arrangements, that Gilbert (1992) notes that in the U.S.. a private sector firm provides
legal advice and communications specifically addressing netting arrangements. ( and
many laws firms provide similar services as well.)
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While attention to contract design is necessary, without defaults and continual testing of
contract features in the courts, reliance upon contract design to provide needed risk
control and protection may tend only to mask the true uncertainties and losses for which
members are potentially liable.

Second, private sector contracting activities also focus on apportioning risks,
defining performance, and allocating losses among participants in a payments system or
exchange in the event that a default occurs. These provisions can take many forms. For
example, in CHIPS, unwinding was a way of apportioning losses ex post other
participants in the system. Agreements are executed, however, that make system
participants liable for portion of losses if problems arise. CHIPS has abandoned
unwinding as a loss apportionment mechanism and has substituted apportioning losses
through collateralization of exposures. Such collateralization provides incentives for
members to control and monitor their own exposure to other clearing house members so
as to protect their collateral.
Third, private sector entities also impose

VarIOUS

types of memberships and

participation requirements. In futures exchanges, for example, members are required to
post collateral in the form of maintenance margins and initial margins. Additional
constraints include membership requirements, minimum capital requirements, and
collateralization and backup lines of credit. All of these rules impose costs on members
which attempt to internalize the costs of risk to the system and its members.
Finally, recognized accounting rules can impact the ease of information transfer
and reduce monitoring costs. Most futures exchanges require that transactions be marked
to market and that any deficiencies in coverage as the result of price or interest rate
movements be made up with immediately available funds. Again, for systems which
operate continuously, this is equivalent to requiring that good funds be posted
continuously. Uniform accounting, especially market-value reporting, increasingly have
become recognized as an important component of effective risk control systems {Gilbert
(1992), Cohen and Roberds (1993)}.
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Conclusions: Responses to risk and uncertainty

Perhaps one the more interesting developments in this evolution of regional and
globalized payments markets in both the public and private sectors has been the push
towards real-time gross settlement systems with collateralization. This applies to both
private systems and publicly run systems. Nowhere are these efforts more apparent than
in Europe where the struggle to create a single financial market place has focused
attention and generated analyses of the underlying issues, with the Group ofTen, and EC
central banks spearheading much of this work (BIS 1990,1993a, 1993b).

At the market level, the process of financial integration suggest that as the
barriers to real production within Europe beak down and as financial institutions operate
branches throughout Europe, more and more of the domestic payment and financial
markets will have cross-border attributes. Hence, the EC central banks have paid
particulars attention to the structure and operations of cross-border and multi-currency
netting and settlement schemes. Table 4 lists the key attributes that the EC committee
have put forth. It is interesting the Committee gives heavy weight to getting "legal
situation" right. Yet, the evidence and analysis suggests that infrastructure difference
from different legal environments are of paramount importance in introducing
uncertainty in payments system operations.

Casual empiricism suggests several reasons why the systems are evolving in this
direction, despite considerable analysis suggesting that netting arrangements are both
more efficient and involve less potential risk. The first reason is that systems,
instruments, and financial markets are evolving faster than the political entities can
harmonize or bring their various rules and regulation into harmony {Kane (1991)}.
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Second, harmonizing systems to control effectively the systemic risk (such as
Herstatt risks) inherent in non-synchronized clearing and settlement systems, such as
foreign exchange markets, even if all the legal rules are in place, requires complete
international coordination and cooperation when payment system principals enter
bankruptcy. That is, unless all market are open 24 hours, Herstatt risk will still be an
important consideration. Such coordination and cooperation is far from certain, and is
clearly not in place.

Third, central banks realize that regardless of the explicit rules governing
exchanges, they still may be thrust into the role of the 'lender of last resort," should
major participants get into financial difficulties which threaten to bring down settlement
and clearing systems. This potential exposure is not only large, but also often outside of
central bank jurisdiction and control. For example, in the U.S., despite all the cross
guarantees, etc., the Federal Reserve is the residual bearer of risk for CHIPS participants.
Interestingly, while the Fed can examine domestic banks many of the CHIPS members
and indirect participants are foreign institutions, over which the Fed has no authority or
jurisdiction. These institutions can potentially, through default, shift CHIPS system
problems to the Fed. This potentially exists across all major markets in which U.S. banks
participate, and carries the same types of implications for the Fed and U.S taxpayer.

Finally, the movement towards expanding the overlapping hours that exchanges
are open will increasingly make the operation of net settlement systems more difficult.
For example, in the extreme, as markets evolve towards 24-hours operations, agreement
upon the exact number of times and when net settlement will be posted becomes an
arbitrary, and essentially unnecessary, complication vis-a-vis real-time gross settlement
systems. In addition, as the pace of technology continues to expand computer storage and
processing capacities, the costs benefits to netting become less and less. With billions of
transactions being moved at virtually the speed of light, the marginal benefits of netting
seem to be declining at an exponential role.
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Table 4. Minimum standards for the design and operation of cross-border and multi-currency netting and

settlement schemes

Attributes

1. Netting schemes should have well-founded legal basis WIder all relevant jurisdictions.

n.

Netting schemes participants should have a clear understanding of the impact of the particular
scheme on each of the fmancial risks affected by netting process.

ill. Multilateral netting systems should have clearly defmed procedures for management of credit
and liquidity risks which specify respective responsibilities of the netting provider and
participants. These procedures should also ensure that all parties have both the incentives and
capabilities to manage and contain each of the risks borne, and that limits are placed on the
maximum level of credit exposure with the largest single net-debit position.
IV. Multilateral netting schemes should, at the minimum, be capable of ensuring the timely
completion of daily settlements in the event of an inability to settle by the participant with the
largest single net-debit positions.
V. Multilateral netting schemes should have objective and publicly disclosed criteria for
admission which permit fair and open access.
VI. All netting schemes should ensure the operational reliability of technical systems and the
availability of backup facilities capable of completing daily processing requirements.

Source: BIS 1993b
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